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Foreign exchange holdings by central banks have increased significantly in 
the recent past.  This article explains this development as a result of the 
liberalization of international capital markets. First, central banks 
accumulate reserves in order to protect the economy from potentially 
detrimental effects of sudden stops of capital flows and flow reversals. 
Second, central banks use the accumulation of reserves as a substitute for 
capital controls. Changes in the level of reserves are a form to manage net 
capital inflows. They permit the central bank to preserve some leeway for an 
independent monetary and financial policy despite the classic policy 
trilemma. The empirical analysis of a large panel data set supports the 
hypothesis that the accumulation of reserves is the consequence of a “fear of 
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1  Introduction 
 
Recent years witnessed an enormous increase in central banks’ foreign exchange holdings. 
Whereas average foreign exchange holdings amounted to 5.1% of GDP in 1975, they reached 
18% of GDP in 2006. This increase is a puzzle for the standard literature on the demand for 
international reserves. Since at the same time exchange rates have become more flexible and 
countries more integrated in the international capital market, standard theory predicts a 
decline in foreign exchange holdings.   
The existing literature usually explains the demand for foreign exchange as a buffer stock to 
defend the exchange rate. Whereas traditional approaches argue that reserves are needed to 
finance imbalances in the balance of payments under a fixed exchange rate system, the more 
recent literature, which emerged after the series of financial crises during the 1990s, focuses 
on the stock of reserves, which is seen as a lifejacket against financial crisis. Both approaches 
coincide in the view that there exists an adequate level of reserve holdings, which is the 
outcome of an optimising behaviour of the central bank. 
 
This article takes a different approach: It explains the accumulation of reserves as a side effect 
of the liberalization of national capital markets and, more particularly, of the integration of 
emerging and developing economies in the world capital market. According to this 
hypothesis, central banks do not optimise their reserve levels, but suffer from a “fear of 
capital mobility”. The accumulation of foreign exchange is a response to capital inflows. It 
aims at reducing the interdependence of an open economy from developments in the rest of 
the world. 
 
Two different lines of argumentation will be presented: First, it is hypothesised that a central 
bank’s reserves increase in the degree of capital mobility. The motive for this behaviour 
might be the central bank’s desire to protect the economy from potentially detrimental effects 
of sudden stops of capital flows and flow reversals. Second, a central bank might accumulate 
reserves in order to manage net capital flows in the absence of capital controls. The 
management of capital inflows allows the central bank to preserve some leeway for the 
conduct of an independent monetary policy despite the classic policy trilemma. Furthermore, 
the central bank can limit the real effects of capital inflows, which might interfere with 
domestic policy objectives.  
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In the first case, the central bank supports the open capital account but takes precautionary 
measures. According to the second motive, it intends to insulate the domestic economic 
policy from the world capital market under a fixed exchange rate. In either case the 
accumulation of reserves can be regarded as a management of capital flows by the central 
bank. 
 
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the hypothesis that central banks 
suffer from a fear of capital mobility. Section 3 discusses different measures of capital 
mobility and shows statistical evidence in support of the hypotheses. Section 4 presents and 
discusses the empirical results. The final section concludes. 
 
 
2  The hypothesis: Fear of capital mobility 
 
The following section describes the hypothesis that central banks suffer from a fear of capital 
mobility. This fear of capital mobility arises in two different forms: First, central banks fear 
the openness of the capital account and, second, manage private capital inflows. 
 
2.1  Capital mobility and the level of reserves 
 
Financial liberalization and economic globalisation both allow a country to profit from 
international capital flows. However, they also make countries more vulnerable to sudden 
stops and capital flow reversals. Therefore, a central bank might take precautionary measures 
in the form of foreign exchange hoardings.  
 
On theoretical grounds the effect of the liberalization of the capital account on the level of 
reserves is ambiguous. On the one hand, the eased access to external credit sources reduces 
the importance of reserves in financing international transactions. Any balance of the current 
account can, at least theoretically, be counterbalanced by proportionate capital flows. On the 
other hand, open capital markets increase the exposure to external financial disturbances and 
speculative flows. Especially emerging and developing countries may be subject to sudden 
stops of capital flows and capital flight. 
The risk of capital flight originates from two sources: First, foreign investors might suddenly 
withdraw their capital invested in the domestic economy. Second, domestic agents might 
prefer to invest their wealth in foreign currency. This form of currency substitution may be   4
restricted to currency in circulation or can comprise bank deposits. These savings, in turn, can 
be deposited at domestic or foreign commercial banks. These possibilities of capital flight 
also increase the risk of speculative attacks and ensuing currency crises. 
 
Capital mobility has two dimensions: de jure and de facto capital mobility. De jure capital 
mobility corresponds to the extent and nature of regulations governing capital account 
transactions. It can be measured by the existence of legal restrictions of cross-border capital 
flows. It is a pre-condition for financial integration. De facto capital mobility refers to the 
actual mobility of capital measured by stocks and flows of cross-border assets and liabilities.   
 
Central banks might fear both forms of capital mobility: Countries which have liberalised 
their capital account but whose cross-border capital flows and stocks are limited, might fear 
that domestic investors prefer to invest abroad, leading to large capital outflows. Countries 
with substantial financial linkages to the rest of the world might fear a double outflow of 
capital, namely of domestic and foreign investors. 
 
This reasoning leads to the following hypotheses, which shall be tested empirically in section 
4: 
Hypothesis 1:   The higher the degree of capital mobility, the more foreign exchange a         
 central bank hoards. 
 
This hypothesis can be split into two different lines of argumentation: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: Central banks fear a de jure open capital account independently of the   
 country’s actual degree of integration in the international capital   
 market. 
Hypothesis 1b: Central banks fear the potentially negative effects of a country’s   
                         financial integration. They accumulate foreign exchange in order to   
                         protect the economy from potential sudden stops of capital flows and    
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2.2  Capital flows and changes in reserves: Management of capital inflows 
 
This section is devoted to the hypothesis that central banks actively manage capital flows.
1 
Both capital controls and changes in reserves allow a central bank to manage capital inflows. 
Changes in reserves are evidence for a “fear of capital mobility” if they are a counter 
movement to the removal of capital controls. 
 
2.2.1   Foreign exchange accumulation as a substitute for capital controls 
 
Changes in foreign exchange reserves can be regarded as an imperfect substitute for capital 
controls because both have to a certain extent the same macroeconomic effects.
2 In the 
following paragraphs different theoretical approaches are used to show these common effects. 
 
Balance of payments implications 
Both foreign exchange accumulation and capital controls lead to smaller net capital inflows. 
Through decreased net capital inflows they reduce the pressure towards an appreciation of the 
domestic currency. This might be in the interest of the central bank if a fixed nominal 
exchange rate regime is in place, if the economy pursues a development strategy of export-led 
growth or if a reallocation of resources towards the nontradable sector is not desired. 
The balance of payments restriction implies that both capital controls and the accumulation of 
reserves (ceteris paribus) may lead to an increase in the current account balance. 
                                                 
1 With respect to capital flows, the following definitions apply throughout this article Net capital flows are the 
difference between capital inflows and capital outflows. If this difference is positive, it is also called net capital 
inflows. Capital flows are always measured as private flows excluding changes in official reserves.  
The empirical literature distinguishes two concepts of capital flows: In the terminology of the IMF (see World 
Economic Outlook) total net capital flows comprise direct investment, portfolio investment and other long- and 
short-term investment flows. In the standard balance of payments presentation total net capital flows are equal to 
the balance on the financial account minus the change in reserve assets. Other publications (see UNCTAD 1999, 
p. 100) define net capital flows as the sum of the balance on capital and financial accounts, that is to say they 
additionally include capital account transactions like debt forgiveness, official grants and migrants’ transfers as 
well as the acquisition or disposal of nonproduced, nonfinancial assets (patents, trademarks etc.). For the purpose 
of this article I prefer the first concept because it focuses on the financial account, which is the origin of the 
volatility of capital flows. Capital account transactions, in contrast, are fairly stable or even counter cyclical. 
2 Their degree of substitutability is imperfect because the accumulation of reserves cannot accomplish all effects, 
which are obtained (or at least intended) by capital controls. For instance, whereas capital controls, in the form of 
a fixed-term unremunerated reserve requirement, aim at changing the composition (from portfolio to direct 
investment flows) and maturity structure of capital inflows, the accumulation of foreign exchange cannot bias 
the nature of capital inflows. Moreover, whereas capital controls can be designed to target specific capital flows 
(prohibitions, requirement of special permission for pre-defined types of flows), the accumulation of reserves 
cannot prohibit certain kinds of capital movements. In this sense, the accumulation of reserves is a simple 
instrument that cannot be designed to achieve specific objectives concerning the nature of capital flows. Finally, 
capital controls and the accumulation of foreign exchange are costly distortions of the efficient allocation of 
capital. However, they differ in the distribution of these costs: whereas the costs of capital controls have to be 
carried by lender and borrower, the costs of foreign exchange reserves fall on the society as a whole.      6
If private capital is perfectly mobile, the accumulation of reserves, which is a form of official 
capital export, will be offset by an additional import of private capital. Hence, the capital 
account balance including official reserve changes is unaffected while the gross sum of capital 
flows increases.   
In the case of imperfect capital mobility, the balance of payments restriction implies that the 
accumulation of foreign exchange has to increase the current account balance. To increase the 
current account balance, the exchange rate has to depreciate or – in the case of a fixed 
nominal exchange rate – domestic prices have to fall. In any case, the current account is 
distorted towards less domestic investment and consumption. Exports are driven up and 
imports are depressed. 
If controls are used to reduce capital inflows, they distort the current account towards a 
surplus. So capital controls and the accumulation of foreign exchange are substitutes in the 
sense that both allow the government to increase the current account balance. 
 
Implications for the domestic money market 
The comparable effects of capital controls and reserve accumulation in the face of capital 
inflows also become evident on the domestic money market. Both cushion it from the effects 
of foreigners demanding domestic currency. Net capital inflows imply an increase in the 
supply of foreign currency and an increase in the demand for domestic currency.  According 
to the monetary approach to the exchange rate, this relative increase in the demand for 
domestic currency leads to an appreciation of the exchange rate. 
 
Capital controls, which decrease capital inflows, reduce the demand for domestic currency by 
foreigners. The accumulation of reserves satisfies the foreign demand for domestic currency 
such that the domestic money market remains in equilibrium for a given price level. Both 
policies result in a more depreciated exchange rate than would be the equilibrium outcome 
without policy distortion. 
 
We now turn to common effects of capital controls and reserve accumulation for economic 
policy. 
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Effect 1: Preservation of monetary policy independence 
In the context of a fixed exchange rate, capital controls and the accumulation of reserves 
preserve some room for the conduct of an independent monetary policy despite the classic 
policy trilemma.  
Capital controls loosen the interest rate parity. If capital flows are prohibited or restricted by 
quantitative controls, the domestic interest rate can be set independently of the world interest 
rate. If capital controls are imposed in the form of a tax – an explicit tax or an implicit one 
like an unremunerated reserve requirement –, the domestic interest rate can lie between the 
international interest rate and the international interest rate plus the tax without inducing any 
capital movements. Within this band monetary policy is independent.  
Similarly, foreign exchange interventions give a government some leeway for domestic 
monetary policy in spite of exchange rate fixity. If the central bank sells foreign exchange, 
there is a tendency towards appreciation in the exchange rate. The central bank can at least 
restore the monetary base while holding the exchange rate fixed. A nonsterilized intervention 
is compatible with a larger increase in money supply than a sterilized one. Moreover, if bonds 
in different currencies are imperfect substitutes, the central bank can pursue an expansionary 
policy even if the interventions are sterilized at home and abroad (Branson 1977, Dreher and 
Vaubel 2009). Conversely, an accumulation of reserves allows the central bank to pursue a 
contractionary monetary policy while holding the exchange rate fixed. More precisely, for a 
given money demand at home and abroad the growth rate of the monetary base at home may 
be lower than that abroad. In the case that domestic and foreign-currency bonds are imperfect 
substitutes this is still true for a sterilized intervention. 
 
Effect 2: Reconciliation of the policy trilemma 
The relationship between capital mobility and reserve accumulation can be analysed in the 
framework of the macroeconomic policy trilemma. The trilemma imposes a constraint on the 
choice of macroeconomic policies. It states that the objectives of exchange rate stability, 
monetary independence and capital mobility are mutually inconsistent. Only two out of these 
three possible objectives can be attained jointly.  
Figure 1 illustrates the trilemma. The corners of the triangle show three possible goals of 
economic policy and the sides indicate the policy regimes which meet (pairs of) these goals. 
Since at most two goals can be reached at the same time, the side connecting the two chosen 
corners excludes the attainment of the third goal. If, for example, a country opts for an 
independent monetary policy under an open capital account, it cannot pursue an active   8
exchange rate policy. The demand for and supply of  domestic and foreign currency, which 
result from the interest rate set by monetary policy and the open capital account, determine 
the level of the exchange rate. 
 
The policy trilemma, however, constrains economic policy only in the long run. Standard 
theories overlook that all three objectives are jointly attainable in the short run if they are 
supported by accompanying policies. Changes in reserves are such a policy to reconcile the 
trilemma. 
 
The accumulation of reserves allows a country to reach the three goals of the trilemma 
simultaneously. To illustrate the mechanisms, consider the example from above in which a 
country opts for an independent monetary policy and capital mobility. According to the 
trilemma, policy cannot stabilize the exchange rate. This, however, is not true in the short run. 
Assume that the given interest rate leads to an outflow of capital such that the exchange rate 
tends to depreciate. The central bank can stabilize the exchange rate if it counteracts the 
outflow of capital by the sale of foreign exchange reserves. This is the policy of exchange rate 
defence through an exchange market intervention.
3 It allows to achieve all three objectives of 
the trilemma until reserves reach their lower bound if domestic and foreign bonds are 
imperfect substitutes.  
Whereas this policy configuration is extensively analysed by economists, the opposite case of 
a foreign exchange intervention aimed at preventing an exchange rate appreciation is usually 
disregarded. According to the trilemma, in the presence of net capital inflows an independent 
monetary policy and a fixed exchange rate system are incompatible. However, if the central 
bank absorbs the capital inflow with the accumulation of reserves, it can reconcile an open 
capital account with an independent monetary policy and a fixed exchange rate. 
 
In general, if the central bank absorbs capital inflows and satisfies capital outflows through 
proportional changes of reserves, it can neutralise the effects of an open capital account. This 
is possible as long as capital is not perfectly mobile. 
 
Net capital inflows increase the relative demand for domestic currency. The demand for 
foreign money decreases and the demand for domestic money increases. According to the 
                                                 
3 It is assumed that the interest rate remains at its level consistent with domestic goals of monetary policy. 
Alternatively, the central bank might rise the interest rate to defend the exchange rate peg. Then, however, it 
would subordinate monetary policy to the objective of a stable exchange rate.    9
monetary approach, the exchange rate appreciates. The exchange rate is stable in the presence 
of net capital inflows if for a given output and interest rates at home and abroad domestic 
money supply increases and foreign money supply decreases. A non-sterilized accumulation 
of foreign reserves satisfies the increased demand for domestic currency and reduces the 
supply of foreign currency. Technically, a central bank can influence the supply of domestic 
and foreign currency such that the exchange rate remains unchanged.  
 
 
In comparison with the opposite policy of exchange rate defence in the face of capital 
outflows, this policy has the merit that there exists no upper reserves bound above which this 
policy is no longer feasible. The recent experience of reserve accumulation shows that this 
policy is sustainable over a long time period.  
 
Since this article focuses on the explanation of the recent period of reserve accumulation, one 
has to question whether the choices countries have made with respect to the trilemma in the 
recent past might have favoured systematic central bank interventions to prevent the exchange 
rate from appreciating. Since the demise of the Bretton Woods system, countries have moved 
towards greater exchange rate flexibility and financial openness (see Figure 2). Nevertheless, 
according to the IMF classification of exchange rates the majority of exchange rates are still 
managed or fixed. This implies that monetary policy autonomy has become more limited in 
many countries. However, the accumulation of reserves by central banks reverses this trend. 
As described in the preceding paragraphs, in this configuration the accumulation of reserves 
may be seen as an instrument to restore monetary independence. Although capital is mobile, 
the central bank intervention can manage capital flows such that both a fixed exchange rate 
and an independent monetary policy can be attained jointly.  
 
Empirical evidence in support of the trilemma is provided by Obstfeld et al. (2005) and 
Aizenman et al. (2008). The latter show empirically that a move towards one goal of the 
trilemma induces a shift away from at least one of the other two policy objectives. They note 
that the accumulation of reserves may be related to the changing configuration of the 
trilemma over time, but do not analyse its role in detail. Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2007) 
argue that in the 2000s foreign exchange interventions increasingly aimed at depressing the 
domestic currency rather than defending it. They ascribe this behaviour to a “fear of 
appreciation”.    10
The foregoing analysis leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2:  The accumulation of foreign exchange is a response of central banks to 
the removal of capital controls. Central banks aim at managing capital 
inflows. 
 
2.2.2  Explanations for the substitution of capital controls by the accumulation of foreign 
exchange 
 
This hypothesis, however, raises the question why governments abolish controls on capital 
movements albeit they still have an interest in managing capital flows.  
It could be that they had to liberalize their capital account due to conditions associated with 
IMF lending or external consultants advised them to do so. Joyce and Noy (2008) find 
empirical evidence that the participation in an IMF programme during the 1990s is correlated 
with capital account liberalization. Perhaps countries could not resist the general market 
development (bandwagon effects) and liberalized their capital account after neighbouring 
countries or members of their peer group had done so.
4 When neighbours relax capital 
controls it becomes harder to justify them politically and economically. At the same time, 
relative to its neighbours, the country becomes a less attractive destination for foreign capital. 
Countries that resist the tendency to relax capital controls fall behind countries that do remove 
controls. Finally, the relaxation of capital controls could be the result of some kind of 
bargaining between industrialized and emerging economies where the first loosened their 
trade barriers and, in return, the second had to open up their capital markets. 
 
The removal of capital controls can be in the proper interest of the central bank. The 
abandonment of capital controls means that the central bank loses one of its instruments of 
financial policy. However, there are several reasons why a central bank could be willing to 
give up capital controls anyway. First, capital controls are not an instrument that can be set 
independently by the central bank; on the contrary, the imposition of capital controls either 
has to be explicitly permitted by the central bank’s statute or be specified by other laws, 
which, in turn, have to be approved by government. In most cases, the central bank 
constitution defines a maximum percentage that can be required as mandatory reserves from 
                                                 
4 Recent studies (e.g. Simmons and Elkins 2004) show empirically that countries are more likely to open their 
capital account when members of their peer group have done so. This behaviour is called “policy contagion”. 
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capital importers. So, in principle, the central bank only enforces and administers the pre-
defined capital controls. The accumulation of reserves, in contrast, is a policy that is 
independently set by the central bank. Capital controls are an inflexible instrument whereas 
the accumulation of reserves can be adjusted easily and without time lag to changing 
economic conditions and objectives of financial policy.  
 
Both capital controls and reserve accumulation are costly distortions but differ in the 
distribution of these costs: Whereas the cost of capital controls have to be born by borrower 
and lender, the costs of foreign exchange reserves fall on the society as a whole. Capital 
controls can lead to revenues for the central bank (for example if unremunerated reserves 
have to be held at the central bank), whereas reserves generally entail quasi-fiscal costs 
because of the interest differential between domestic bonds and bonds denominated in the 
reserve currency.
5 In sum, central banks are financially worse off if capital controls are 
replaced by foreign exchange reserves. However, this might not bother the central bankers. 
The economic theory of bureaucracy assumes that public officials are primarily interested in 
their power, prestige and independence (see Vaubel 1997), but not in the profits of their 
institution. In fact, large reserve holdings may be preferred by the central bank because they 
increase its power and independence from government. 
 
 
3  Data and descriptive statistics 
 
3.1  Description of the data 
 
The empirical analysis is carried out on the basis of a pooled data set of cross-country and 
time-series observations. It contains annual data from 1975 to 2003 for a maximum of 181 
countries. Since data for several explanatory variables are missing for some countries, the 
number of countries used in the econometric analysis depends on the particular specification 
and is indicated in the respective tables. It ranges from 70 to 174 countries. With a few 
exceptions data are taken from the International Financial Statistics of the IMF and the World 
Development Indicators of the World Bank. A detailed description of the sample, variables 
and their data sources can be found in appendices A and B.  
                                                 
5 This argumentation assumes that the effect of the accumulation of reserves on the domestic monetary base is 
sterilized by the issue of domestic bonds. 
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3.2   Measures of capital mobility 
 
For our analysis of the links between capital mobility and the accumulation of reserves both 
concepts of de jure and de facto capital mobility are relevant. The empirical analysis uses 
different measures of capital mobility, which allow to distinguish between the effects of de 
jure and de facto capital mobility. 
 
Most indices of de jure capital account openness are based on the information provided in the 
IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). It 
offers a binary variable that informs about the existence of controls in different categories of 
restrictions.  
An index of capital account openness that is based on this information was developed by 
Chinn and Ito (2002, 2006). It embodies four binary dummy variables on restrictions on 
international financial transactions. In the empirical analysis I refer to this index as de jure 
capital mobility (Chinn-Ito) 
An alternative index of de jure capital mobility is provided by Edwards (2007). He combines 
the information of the indices of Quinn (2003) and Mody and Murshid (2005), which are 
based on data from the IMF. Country-specific information is used to revise and refine the 
index. Since the index provides data only until the year 2000, regressions including the index 
cover a reduced period ending in 2000. This variable is called de jure capital mobility 
(Edwards) in the empirical analysis. 
 
A measure of de facto capital mobility is constructed from data on external capital stocks. As 
proposed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) an index is given by the sum of total external 
assets and total external liabilities as a proportion of GDP.   
 
Additionally, as a proxy for the integration of an economy in the international markets we use 
an index of economic globalisation. It is a sub-index of the KOF index of globalisation 
proposed by Dreher (2006). The index of economic globalisation has two main components, 
which are weighted equally: actual flows of goods and capital and restrictions to these flows. 
Hence, this index combines information of de jure and de facto capital mobility with 
information of trade openness.  
 
For all indices higher values indicate that countries are more open to cross-border financial 
transactions.   13
 
Figure 2 illustrates the evolution of capital mobility over time. All four measures indicate a 
trend of increasing capital mobility. This trend was temporarily halted by the Latin American 
debt crisis, the Mexican Tequila crisis in 1994 and the East Asian financial crisis. This overall 
trend is independent of a country’s capital mobility at the beginning of our period of 
consideration: The trend is observable in industrial, emerging and developing countries. 
Whereas on average industrial countries are in every single year more open than the other two 
country groups, capital mobility in emerging markets does not differ much from that in 
developing countries. Emerging markets are characterised by a higher volatility of capital 
mobility over time. 
 
3.3  Statistical evidence 
 
In the case that a central bank does not intervene in the foreign exchange market or intervenes 
only temporarily, the current account and the capital account excluding reserve changes are 
the main components of the balance of payments. Changes in official reserves are only a 
residual entry that brings about the overall balance. Every international transaction leads to 
two offsetting entries in the balance of payments. Since the balance of the current account 
equals the change in a country’s net foreign liabilities, a current account deficit is offset by a 
surplus of the capital account, namely net capital inflows.    
This picture has changed dramatically since the Asian financial crisis (see Figure 3). The 
current account deficits of the developing countries as a group have been replaced by 
surpluses in 1999. At the same time, these countries still registered net capital inflows 
(excluding changes in reserves) despite an initial fall in capital inflows. This joint incidence 
of net private capital inflows and a current account surplus is somewhat unusual. Capital 
inflows cannot be explained as the counterpart of a current account deficit, that is to say, they 
do not finance the current account deficit.  
The puzzle can be solved when we include the change in official reserves in the analysis. In 
fact, since 1999 the developing countries registered net financial outflows including official 
reserves. Hence, they have increasingly become net exporters of capital. The increase of 
reserves equals the sum of current account surplus and net capital inflows (plus errors and 
omissions). 
 
Table 1 shows the absolute values of net capital inflows and changes in reserves as well as 
changes in reserves expressed as a percentage of inflows over different time periods and for   14
different country groups. The variable of primary interest is the change in reserves expressed 
as a percentage of capital inflows. In the second half of the 1970s, changes in reserves 
accounted for a relatively large part of capital inflows. This is primarily due to the low level 
of cross-border capital flows during this period. Since the second wave of capital account 
liberalization, which took place in the late 1980s and early 1990s, this has changed 
fundamentally: In the 1980s, capital flows increased such that the accumulation of reserves 
only offset a minor part of capital inflows (between 7.7% in the world and 13.1% in 
developing countries). Since then, these figures have increased steadily. Between 2000 and 
2003, the majority of capital inflows to emerging and developing countries was reversed via 
the accumulation of reserves, namely 86.5% and 76.3%, respectively. This means that in 
developing countries only 23.7% of capital inflows (emerging markets 13.5%) could be used 
for domestic investment. Central banks in emerging and developing countries increasingly 
offset net capital flows. Both country groups show the same pattern, which, however, is more 
pronounced in emerging markets.  
A large part of net private capital inflows is absorbed – or, to say it more precisely, reversed – 
by national central banks, which accumulate official foreign exchange. Consequently, only a 
minor part of the net private capital inflow is invested domestically. 
This is also first evidence that central banks replaced capital controls by a policy of reserve 
accumulation, thereby still pursuing the objective of regulating capital flows. In comparison 
with developing countries, emerging markets as a group are characterised by both less capital 
account restrictions (see Figure 2) and a larger extent of capital inflow management. 
 
Figure 4 shows the Chinn-Ito index of capital mobility. It compares the average value of the 
index over all countries with its value for the ten countries that accumulated the largest 
absolute value of reserves over the period 1996-2006. It is striking that until the East Asian 
financial crisis these ten countries were characterised by a significantly higher degree of de 
jure capital mobility than the average country. This is first evidence that countries which have 
had few capital controls tend to hoard reserves. In 1998, capital mobility of the reserve 
accumulaters fell to the level of an average country and has not differed significantly from the 
average country since then.     
 
Finally, Figure 5 presents some country examples that illustrate the effects of a removal of 
capital controls. The graphs show the time-series of capital inflows, reserve changes and de 
jure capital mobility for India, Korea, Russia and the Slovak Republic. Despite some   15
downward outliers in crisis years, capital inflows increased after the liberalization of the 
capital account. More importantly, changes in reserves increased simultaneously. The reserve 
changes were larger than the capital inflows. These country cases may be regarded as first 
evidence that the accumulation of foreign exchange and capital controls are substitutes.  
 
This preliminary empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that despite the removal of 
capital controls governments still want to control capital flows. They now do it in a disguised 
way by accumulating foreign exchange reserves. Non-market barriers to capital movements – 
capital controls in the form of taxes, administrative controls, prohibitions and quantity 
controls – have been replaced by a policy of reserve accumulation of a non-market actor – the 
domestic central bank. To put it differently: Methods have changed, but the objective of 
regulating net capital flows remained the same. 
 
 
4  Regression analysis 
 
The remaining task consists in testing empirically whether the degree of capital mobility has 
an effect on the level of reserves (hypothesis 1) and whether capital inflows are managed 
through changes in reserves (hypothesis 2).  
 
4.1  Traditional control variables 
 
The set of control variables consists of those variables that were identified as significant 
determinants of the level of reserves in studies of the demand for reserves (Aizenman and Lee 
2007, Lane and Burke 2001).  
Trade openness is included to control for the effects of real linkages with other economies. 
The more open the economy, the more vulnerable it is to external shocks and is expected to 
hold more reserves for precautionary motives. External debt is another source of vulnerability.  
Empirical studies show that both a high level of external debt and a low level of reserves 
increase the probability of a financial crisis. Reserves might offset this vulnerability. 
Therefore, it is expected that countries with a high level of external debt hold more reserves 
for precautionary reasons. Additionally, short-term external debt is included.  
According to the monetary approach to the balance of payments, any disequilibrium in the 
money market leads to an equal change in the level of reserves. Therefore, a proxy for 
monetary disequilibrium is included. in our set of determinants of the level of reserves.   16
Since the time-series of reserves are characterized by a high degree of persistence, the 
determination of the level of reserves is a natural candidate for a dynamic specification that 
includes the lagged level of reserves as one of its determinants. This specification can be 
motivated by a partial adjustment or habit-persistence model. 
The dependent variable international reserves is measured net of gold holdings and scaled by 
GDP. 
 
4.2  Estimation results 
 
We first test the hypothesis that foreign exchange holdings are larger, the higher the degree of 
capital mobility is (hypothesis 1). Table 2 presents the results for a static specification where 
the dependent variable is reserves over GDP. Country fixed effects are included in all 
regressions. Column 1 contains the benchmark regression, which includes the control 
variables that were found to be significant determinants of reserve holdings in other studies. 
The results confirm previous findings: The more open countries are with respect to trade of 
goods and services, the more reserves they hold. Reserve holdings increase with the amount 
of total external debt, but decrease in short-term external debt. The latter effect supports the 
hypothesis that for a given external indebtedness an increase in short-term borrowing is an 
indication of an emerging financial crisis. Hence, under these circumstances short-term debt 
increases and reserves fall. The measure for a disequilibrium in the domestic money market is 
not significant. The overall explanatory power of the included covariates is low (R
2=0.04)
6.  
Columns 2 to 6 add different measures for capital mobility to test the hypothesis that 
countries increase their reserve holdings in the face of increasing capital mobility. Columns 2 
and 3 examine the hypothesis 1a and columns 4 to 6 hypothesis 1b. 
Column 2 analyses the effect of de jure capital mobility proxied by the index of Chinn and Ito 
(2002, 2006). The coefficient is significant and positive implying that countries with fewer 
restrictions on capital flows hold a larger amount of reserves. Sign and significance of the 
control variables are unchanged with respect to column 1, which does not control for capital 
mobility. The effect of a monetary disequilibrium is now significant with the expected sign. 
The adjusted R
2 doubles due to the inclusion of de jure capital mobility 
Column 3 examines the robustness of these results. It uses an alternative measure for de jure 
capital mobility, namely the index of Edwards (2007). The effect of capital mobility is again 
positive and significant. In comparison with the Chinn-Ito index, Edwards uses a wider set of 
                                                 
6 This R
2, however, is due to the covariates. A simple regression with fixed effects but without covariates leads 
to a R
2 of zero.   17
information to construct this index. It shows that the results of column 2 are insensitive with 
respect to the definition of de jure capital mobility. The smaller magnitude of the effect comes 
from the fact that both indices use different scales with the Edwards index usually being 
larger than the Chinn-Ito index. 
We now turn to the question whether de facto capital mobility has an effect on reserve 
holdings (hypothesis 1b). To this end, column 4 adds a measure of de facto capital mobility 
defined as the sum of external assets and liabilities divided by GDP. This measure is named 
financial openness. The effect is positive and significant. Countries with a large stock of 
cross-border assets relative to their economic size hold more international reserves. However, 
the inclusion of this measure for de facto capital mobility affects the results with respect to the 
standard control variables. Trade openness and short-term external debt are no longer 
significant and total external debt is significant, but with a negative sign. This might be due to 
the fact that total external debt and the measure for de facto capital mobility are correlated 
since the construction of the latter contains total external debt. Hence, the assumption of 
exogenous regressors is violated and the results might be biased. Therefore, we re-estimate 
the effect of de facto capital mobility after dropping total external debt and the proxy for a 
monetary disequilibrium (see column 5). Trade openness and short-term external debt have 
the expected effects. A country’s reserves increase with the degree of its de facto openness to 
the world capital market. 
Economic globalisation, which is added in column 6, is a combined measure of de facto and 
de jure capital mobility and trade openness. It confirms the previous results that capital 
mobility – both de jure and de facto – increases a country’s reserve holdings. This 
specification has the highest explanatory power if the misspecified results of column 4 are 
disregarded. 
 
Table 3 replicates the regressions of Table 2 with the difference that it uses a dynamic 
specification that includes the lagged level of reserves as one of the explanatory variables. 
The dynamics imply that central banks adjust their reserve holdings gradually to the desired 
level. As a consequence, the fixed effects estimator is asymptotically biased. Therefore, the 
difference GMM estimator, also known as the Arellano-Bond estimator, is used. The tests of 
the validity of instruments support these specifications.  
Two of the four measures of capital mobility are significant and positive, namely the de jure 
index of Edwards and the measure of financial openness. The effects of the control variables 
have the expected sign. Hence, although with reduced significance, the dynamic specification   18
supports the hypothesis of a positive relationship between capital mobility and the level of 
foreign exchange holdings to some extent. 
The previously used measures of de facto capital mobility implicitly assumed that the fear of 
capital mobility stems from the fact that a central bank has less instruments to steer foreign 
liabilities and capital flows when the capital account is liberalized. Table 4 turns to the 
domestic component of capital flight, which starts when domestic agents attempt to convert 
their bank deposits in foreign exchange. Since this domestic component of capital flight is 
proportional to the liabilities of the domestic banking system, broad money supply (M2) is 
used as an indicator of potential capital flight. The static estimation results (columns 1 to 3) 
show that central banks’ reserves are higher, the larger the potential for domestic capital flight 
is. As columns 2 and 3 show, this effect comes in addition to the effect of de jure capital 
mobility and economic globalisation. When a dynamic specification is considered (columns 4 
and 5), the effect of M2 is only significant in the specification with economic globalisation.     
 
So far it was shown that there exists a fear of capital mobility in the sense that central banks 
increase their holdings of foreign exchange when capital controls are dismantled and when 
the integration in the international financial market deepens (hypothesis 2). We now analyse 
the related but different question whether central banks’ accumulation of foreign exchange is 
a direct response to capital flows. The accumulation of reserves is a form of managing capital 
inflows and allows a central bank to influence the amount of foreign capital channelled to 
domestic uses even in the absence of capital controls. Hence, the accumulation of foreign 
exchange might be a substitute for capital controls.  
Table 5 tests whether capital flows cause changes in reserves. According to the hypothesis, 
higher net capital inflows imply that central banks absorb a part of these inflows via the 
accumulation of reserves. The dependent variable is nominal changes in reserves net of gold, 
measured in US$. Net capital flows are measured by the balance of the financial account of 
the balance of payments, i.e., excluding the central bank. It equals the difference between 
capital inflows and capital outflows. It encompasses the categories direct investment, 
portfolio investment, financial derivatives and other investment. As possible other 
determinants of reserve changes, changes in money supply, a disequilibrium in the domestic 
money market and a dummy for a currency crisis are included. Given a central bank’s balance 
sheet, an increase in money supply implies a decrease in domestic bonds in private hands or 
an increase in international reserves. According to the monetary approach to the balance of 
payments, any disequilibrium in the domestic money market implies a reduction of reserves   19
of equal size. Finally, we control for the effect that reserves generally fall during a currency 
crisis. The dummy for currency crises takes the value one in years where a speculative attack 
– unsuccessful or successfully leading to a crisis – is identified by an exchange market 
pressure index. Additional control variables, derived from the regressions in Table 2, are 
changes of trade openness, of total external debt and of short-term external debt. However, 
they all turn out to be insignificant in regressions explaining changes in reserves. 
In all specifications of Table 5, net capital flows have no significant impact on reserve 
changes. Their explanatory power is zero (R
2=0). The other three possible determinants, 
however, are significant and have the expected signs: An increase in money supply is 
associated with a positive change in reserves whereas an excess money supply reduces 
reserves. Reserves are significantly lower in years with a currency crisis.  
 
The missing influence of net capital flows on reserve changes might be due to the fact that 
central banks react with a very long lag to net capital flows (see Table 1) or that they respond 
asymmetrically to capital flows. The action of a central bank in the face of capital inflows (= 
positive net capital flows) might differ from its response to capital outflows (= negative net 
capital flows). We hypothesise that central banks manage capital inflows via the accumulation 
of reserves since capital inflows cause an appreciation of the exchange rate and imply an 
increasing external indebtedness of the country. If there are capital outflows, the central bank 
does not intervene in the foreign exchange market as long as these outflows do not lead to a 
systemic crisis.  
Table 6 shows the results. The variable capital inflows equals the amount of capital inflows 
and is set to zero if capital inflows are zero or negative. The variable capital outflows, 
respectively, equals capital outflows and zero otherwise.  
The results fully support the hypothesis. In all specifications (columns 1 to 4) capital inflows 
lead to a significant increase in reserves.
7 Central banks offset a fraction of capital inflows via 
the accumulation of foreign exchange and thereby export capital. In the face of capital 
outflows, central banks do not adjust their reserves. An increase in money supply affects 
reserve changes positively (column 2) whereas a disequilibrium in the domestic money 
market leads to a fall of reserves (column 3). Currency crises are associated with losses of 
reserves (column 4). 
                                                 
7 Although capital flows cannot explain reserve changes (R2 = 0), reserves increase significantly when capital 
flows are positive. The latter result suffices to support the hypothesis that central banks manage capital inflows.   20
Finally, Table 7 investigates whether central banks dislike large swings in the financial 
account. It analyses whether changes in capital flows – i.e. from a moderate level of capital 
inflows to a much larger amount – are offset by changes in reserves. Changes in net capital 
inflows are defined as changes of the financial account on a year-to-year basis. Independently 
of the specification, this variable has a positive and significant effect on reserve changes. A 
positive change in capital flows with respect to the previous year is counteracted by an 






The empirical analysis supports our hypothesis: The accumulation of foreign exchange may 
be regarded as an indication of a “fear of capital mobility“ suffered by central banks. First, 
central banks fear that capital inflows are volatile and subject to sudden reversals. Therefore, 
they demand reserves as a buffer stock against potential capital flight. Second, central banks 
accumulate reserves in order to manage net capital flows in the absence of capital controls 
because they fear the real effects which these capital flows might have on the real exchange 
rate and thus on the domestic economy. 
 
The second argument differs in an important way from the standard analysis concerning the 
accumulation of reserves. If the accumulation of foreign exchange is explained as a buffer 
stock, which will be used to defend the exchange rate in a period of crisis, what matters is the 
level of reserves. The accumulation of reserves itself has no function and, more precisely, the 
timing of the accumulation is irrelevant. However, if the objective of the foreign exchange 
accumulation consists in managing capital flows, the accumulation itself – and its effects – is 
the target of the central bank policy. The level of reserves does not matter. Only changes in 
reserves have macroeconomic effects. 
 
These results also affect the literature on the costs and benefits of capital account 
liberalization. These studies have to take the costs of increased foreign exchange holdings into 
account when capital account liberalizations are evaluated. 
For further research there remains to find out whether this foreign exchange buffer is rational 
in the sense that countries that accompanied the liberalization of the capital account by an 
increased level of reserves outperformed less prudent countries in terms of growth and   21
volatility. Moreover, one could analyse whether the potentially positive effects of a reserve 
lifejacket are temporary, namely restricted to the process of liberalization, or long-lasting, 
thus arising also for countries that are known for their open capital account.  
 
In sum, the accumulation of foreign exchange has to be analysed in a broader context. Central 
banks might deliberately distort the balance of payments. Foreign reserves are not only used 
to defend the exchange rate in periods of crisis but also to manage capital flows even in 
periods without major economic disturbances. The liberalization of capital markets is to a 
certain extent compensated by the accumulation of official reserves. A microeconomic policy 
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Note:   The scale on the left-hand side axis corresponds to the Chinn-Ito index and the measure for financial   
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Current account balance Net private capital flows Change in reserves
 
 
Data source: World Economic Outlook database, April 2008 
 
Notes:   A poitive sign in the change of reserves indicates an increase in foreign exchange holdings. 
             Net capital flow is equal to the balance of the financial account. 
             The data cover 146 emerging and developing countries as well as selected advanced economies (Hong    
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Figure 5: Capital account openness, capital flows and reserve accumulation:  
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World  Emerging-market 






Billions of dollars 
  Net capital inflow  608.0  44.0  103.9 
  Change in reserves  120.4  21.4  34.9 
    
Percentage of net capital inflow 
  Change in reserves  19.8  48.6  33.6 






Billions of dollars 
  Net capital inflow  4093.9  178.7  257.5 
  Change in reserves  316.6  22.9  33.9 
    
Percentage of net capital inflow 
  Change in reserves 
 






Billions of dollars 
  Net capital inflow  13033.8  1389.9  1573.9 
  Change in reserves  838.4  368.0  551.3 
 
   
Percentage of net capital inflow 
  Change in reserves 
 
6.4 26.5  35.0 
 
2000-2003     
Billions of dollars 
  Net capital inflow  12467.0  623.2  911.4 
  Change in reserves  1121.6  539.2  695.6 
 
   
Percentage of net capital inflow 
  Change in reserves  9.0  86.5  76.3 
     
 
 
Note:   Net capital inflows are defined as changes of the investment position of foreigners in the domestic 
economy in the categories direct investment, portfolio investment and other investment. Due to data 
limitations, investment in financial derivatives is not included although it is a component of the 
financial account. Since this definition only considers transactions of foreigners, it differs from the 
financial account (= net capital flows), which additionally takes the transactions of domestic residents 
into account.  
  
  The group of emerging-market countries contains the following countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
China, Egypt, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Poland, 
Russia, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey 
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Table 2: Reserves and capital mobility: Static models 
Dependent variable: Reserves/GDP 
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Short-term external debt,  





























    
De jure capital mobility 
(Edwards) 
   0.0006 
(3.71***) 
   





Economic globalisation            0.0021 
(7.11***) 
Number  of  countries  119  119  112 95 103 72 
Number  of  observations  2007 1911 1475 1570 2253 1313 
R
2  (overall)  0.04 0.08 0.08 0.31 0.13 0.17 
 
Notes:  
t-statistics (in brackets) computed with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
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Table 3: Reserves and capital mobility: Dynamic models 
Dependent variable: Reserves/GDP 




(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 





















Total external debt 







Short-term external debt,  























   





Financial openness      0.0346 
(3.58***) 
 
Economic  globalisation     0.0007 
(0.91) 
Number of countries  118  109  94  70 
Number  of  observations  1740 1318 1428 1194 
Sargan Test (p-level)  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0 
Arellano-Bond-Test  (p-level)  0.97 0.96 0.79 0.66 
 
Notes:  
t-statistics (in brackets) computed with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
As recommended by Arellano and Bond in the case of finite samples, the coefficients are obtained from 
a two-step estimation, whereas the t-statistics are based on the one-step standard errors. 
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4: Reserves and capital mobility: the domestic component 




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Lagged endogenous variable 
















Total external debt 











Short-term external debt,  

































Number of countries  129  129  77  129  75 
Number  of  observations  2685 2519 1801 2311 1641 
Method of estimation  Fixed effects 
 





2 0.08  0.11  0.22     
Sargan Test (p-level)        1.0  1.0 
Arellano-Bond-Test  
(p-level) 
     0.60  0.68 
 
Notes:  
t-statistics (in brackets) computed with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
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Table 5: Management of capital flows 
Dependent variable: Changes in reserves 




(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Net capital flows 




















(excess money supply) 




Currency crisis, dummy        -700.17 
(-1.67*) 
Number  of  countries  174 168 159 158 
Number  of  observations  3479 3220 2660 2618 
R
2  (overall)  0.00 0.14 0.26 0.30 
 
Notes:  
t-statistics (in brackets) computed with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
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Table 6: Management of capital inflows: Asymmetric effects 
Dependent variable: Changes in reserves 




(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Capital inflows 





























(excess money supply) 




Currency crisis, dummy        -730.05 
(-1.69*) 
Number  of  countries  174 168 159 159 
Number  of  observations  3479 3220 2660 2660 
Adjusted R
2  (overall)  0.00 0.14 0.26 0.26 
 
Notes:  
t-statistics (in brackets) computed with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
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Table 7: Management of capital flows: Changes in net capital flows 
Dependent variable: Changes in reserves 




(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 




















(excess money supply) 




Currency crisis, dummy        -768.81 
(-1.96**) 
Number  of  countries  174 168 159 158 
Number  of  observations  3383 3133 2611 2573 
Adjusted R
2  (overall)  0.00 0.14 0.26 0.30 
 
Notes:  
t-statistics (in brackets) computed with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
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Note: Countries marked with an asterisk belong to the group of emerging-market countries. 
 
 Appendix B: List of variables and data sources 
 
























































































Net international reserves comprise special 
drawing rights, reserves of IMF members held 
by the IMF, and holdings of foreign exchange 
under the control of monetary authorities. Gold 
holdings are excluded. Data are in current U.S. 
dollars. 
 
GDP is measured as gross domestic product in 
constant international dollars with the year 2000 
as base. An international dollar has the same 
purchasing power over GDP as the U.S. dollar 
has in the United States. This measure of GDP is 
divided by the population which counts all 
residents regardless of legal status or citizenship.
 
Openness is defined as the sum of exports and 
imports divided by GDP. Data are expressed in 
per cent. 
 
Total external debt is the sum of public, publicly 
guaranteed, and private nonguaranteed long-term 
debt, use of IMF credit, and short-term debt. 
Data are in current U.S. dollars divided by GDP.
 
Short-term external debt includes all debt that 
has an original maturity of one year or less. Data 
are in current U.S. dollars divided by GDP. 
 
Money (line 34 IFS) is the sum of currency 
outside banks and demand deposits (excluding 
those of the central government). Data are in 
millions of current national currency.  
 
M2 is the sum of M1 and quasi money. Quasi 
money (line 35 IFS) is defined as the sum of 
time, savings and foreign currency deposits of 
residents (excluding the central government). 
Data are in millions of current national currency.
 
Money market rate (line 60b IFS): interest rate 
on short-term lending between financial 
institutions, measured in per cent. 
 
   
Appendix B (continued) 
 
Variable Source  Description 
 
































































Measure of the de jure openness of the capital 
account. Calculation is based on the binary 
dummy variables of the IMF’s Annual Report on 
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions (AREAR).  
 
Index that combines the measures from Quinn 
(2003) and Mody and Murshid (2002) [both are 
based on the information provided by the 
AREAR] and information from country-specific 
sources 
 
Sum of total external assets and liabilities 




Index based on actual flows of goods and capital 
and restrictions concerning these flows. 
 
 
Financial account (IFS line 78bjd) is defined as 
the difference of net capital inflows (investment 
from domestic residents abroad) and net capital 
outflows (investment from foreigners in the 
domestic economy). It comprises direct 
investment, portfolio investment, financial 
derivatives and other investment. 
 
The identification of a currency crisis is based on 
an exchange market pressure index. The 
calculation follows the procedure as described in 
Eichengreen et al. (1996). 
 
 